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WAITS v. FRITO-LAY, INC.: NINTH CIRCUIT 
REAFFIRMS VIABILITY OF VOICE 
MISAPPROPRIATION AS A CALIFORNIA 
TORT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Waits v. Frito-Lay,t the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed a celebrity's right to protect a distinctive voice from 
commercial misappropriation and upheld the viability of voice 
misappropriation as a tort in California.2 The court upheld 
awards of compensatory and punitive damages, and also af-
firmed that Waits had standing to sue the defendants for false 
endorsement. S 
II. FACTS 
Tom Waits is a singer, actor, and songwriter who has taken 
a strong philosophical stand against commercial endorsements 
throughout his career. One of Waits' songs, "Step Right Up," is 
an indictment of the hucksterism and commercialism that per-
1. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (per Boochever, J.; the 
other panel members were Browning, J., and Reinhardt, J.). 
2. [d. at 1100. 
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vade modern life. Ironically, "Step Right Up" was used as the 
basis for a commercial advertising Frito-Lay's new product, Sal-
saRio Doritos, although both the advertising company, Tracy-
Locke, and Frito-Lay were aware of Waits' long-standing disap-
proval of commercial endorsements.4 
To perform in the commercial, Tracy-Locke chose singer 
Stephen Carter, who was able to closely mimic Waits' voice.1i Be-
cause of fears that the Carter version was too imitative of Waits, 
Tracy-Locke also made an alternate version of the commercial 
with another singer.s 
Knowing that the Carter version of the radio commercial 
could potentially expose them to liability, Tracy-Locke con-
sulted legal counsel.' Tracy-Locke's counsel ventured an opinion 
that only Waits' singing style, not his voice, was imitated in the 
radio commercial, and that style is not something an artist can 
claim as his or her own.8 Relying on a narrow interpretation of 
the recent decision in Midler v. Ford Motor CO.,9 the advertising 
agency then recommended the Carter version and offered to in-
demnify Frito-Lay for any claims that might arise from using 
the commercia1.10 Frito-Lay decided to use the Carter version 
for their advertising. 11 
The radio commercial was broadcast in September and Oc-
tober, 1988, in 61 markets nationwide, including Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, and Chicago. Waits heard the commercial in Los 
Angeles. 12 
In November, 1988, Waits sued Frito-Lay and Tracy-Locke 
in federal district court for voice misappropriation under Cali-
fornia law and for false endorsement under the Lanham Act. 13 
4. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cit. 1992). 
5.Id. 
6. Id. at 1098. 
7.Id. 
8.Id. 
9. Midler, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992). 
10. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098. 
11.Id. 
12.Id. 
13. Id. The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, codified in U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., was passed 
in 1946 to protect commercial parties from unfair competition. 
2
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The case was tried to a jury in April and May, 1990.14 The jury 
found in Waits' favor, awarding him $375,000 in compensatory 
damages and $2 million in punitive damages for voice misappro-
priation, and $100,000 in damages for violation of the Lanham 
Act's prohibition on false representation. II! The trial court also 
awarded Waits attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act.16 
On appeal, Frito-Lay and Tracy-Locke challenged the 
court's reliance on Midler, which recognized voice misappropria-
tion as a tort in California. The defendants also challenged the 
elements of voice misappropriation, the availability of certain 
compensatory and punitive damages, and Waits' standing to sue 
for false endorsement under the Lanham Act.17 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's findings, but va-
cated the award of damages under the Lanham Act because it 
duplicated other compensatory damages.18 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. V OICE MISAPPROPRIATION 
In Midler, the Ninth Circuit held that "when a distinctive 
voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately 
imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated 
what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California. IIl9 
The court explained that the Midler voice misappropriation tort 
stems from a "violation of the right of publicity, the right of a 
person whose identity has commercial value - most often a ce-
lebrity - to control the commercial use of that identity."20 Mid-
ler established that when a celebrity's voice is an integral part of 
that person's identity, the "right of publicity" prohibits imita-
tions of the voice for commercial purposes without the celeb-
14. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098. 
15. Id. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), forbids false 
representation. 
16. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098. Section 35 of the Lanham Act, as amended in 1988, 
provides for attorneys' fees in "exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
17. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1096. 
18.Id. 
19. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (emphasis added). 
20. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1993). 
3
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rity's consent.21 
The jury determined that Waits has a distinctive and widely 
known voice and found that the defendants had violated Waits' 
right of publicity by broadcasting a commercial "which featured 
a deliberate imitation of Waits' voice."22 
1. Continuing Viability of Midler - Preemption by Federal 
Copyright Law 
The defendants raised three arguments concerning the voice 
misappropriation claim. First, they argued that Midler was "im-
pliedly overruled" by the Supreme Court's decision in Bonito 
Boats, Inc. u. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 28 and was preempted 
by the federal Copyright Act.24 Second, the defendants claimed 
that the court's jury instructions defining the elements of voice 
misappropriation were improper. 211 Third, the defendants dis-
puted both the compensatory and punitive damage awards.~6 
The Ninth Circuit responded to the defendants' arguments 
by emphasizing that Bonito did not create a broad rule that fed-
eral patent law always preempts state law.27 Rather, the court 
held that Bonito reaffirmed the right of states to "place limited 
regulations on the use of unpatented designs in order to prevent 
consumer confusion as to the source."28 The court pointed out 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized the authority 
of states to protect the right of entertainers to control publicity 
about themselves.29 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed its holding in Midler that copy-
right preemption does not apply to cases of voice misappropria-
tion, because a voice cannot be the subject matter of copyright.30 
21. [d. 
22. [d. at 1098-99. 
23. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
24. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(l) (1976). 
25. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165. 
29. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 
433 U.S. 562 (1977)). 
30. [d. at noD. 
4
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The court reasoned that Waits' voice misappropriation claim 
was based on an invasion of a personal property right: Waits' 
right of publicity to control the public use of his identity as em-
bodied in his voice. SI The elements of a voice misappropriation 
claim (when the voice rather than style is imitated, and when 
the voice is sufficiently distinctive and widely known) are 0 differ-
ent from elements of a copyright infringement case. S2 Therefore, 
Waits' voice misappropriation claim was not preempted by fed-
eral copyright law.ss 
2. Jury Instructions 
The lower court instructed the jury that voice misappropria-
tion consists of the deliberate misappropriation for commercial 
purposes of (1) a voice, that is (2) distinctive, and (3) widely 
known. S4 The defendants argued that these instructions pro-
vided incorrect definitions of the three Midler tort elements.311 
a. "Voice" vs. "Style" 
The defendants conceded that a celebrity's voice is pro-
tected by Midler, but argued that their SalsaRio Doritos radio 
commercial copied Waits' style, not his voice. The defendants 
proposed a jury instruction that defined style and stated that 
style is not subject to ownership. The defendants argued further 
that when the trial court refused the "style" instruction, the jury 
was misled °into believing they could consider style as well as 
voice.ss 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the voice misappropriation in-
structions and concluded that the jury was riot misled, as the 
instructions limited the jury's consideration to voice. S7 The trial 
judge did instruct the jury that style imitation alone is insuffi-






36. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100-01. 
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Ninth Circuit emphasized that the tort of voice misappropria-
tion involves an imitation so realistic that "people who were fa-
miliar with plaintiff's voice who heard the commercial believed 
plaintiff performed it."S9 This distinction adds an additional el-
ement to Midler's formulation of voice misappropriation: actual 
confusion.40 
b. Definition of "Distinctive" 
The defendants contended that the jury instruction on dis-
tinctiveness was unfair and inaccurate because it confused the 
distinctiveness of a voice with its identifiability or recognizabil-
ity.41 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that 
the defendants' distinction had no basis in law.42 
c. Definition of "Widely Known" 
The defendants also argued that Waits' voice was identifi-
able by only a small number of people, so it failed to meet the 
"widely known" test of Midler. The' court responded to this ar-
gument by noting that the Midler protection was intended to 
cover the voices of many popular singers who fall short of super-
stardom. Instead of allowing relief only to the most famous of 
entertainers, the amount of damages sought in each case is a re-
flection of the extent of the singer's celebrity and injury.4s 
3. Compensatory Damage Award 
The jury awarded Waits $100,000 for the fair market value 
of his services, $200,000 for injury to his peace, happiness and 
feelings, and $75,000 for injury to his goodwill, professional 
standing and future publicity value. The defendants challenged 
the latter two awards, contending that such damages are un-
available as a matter of law and that there was no evidentiary 
support for the awards.44 
39. ld. (emphasis original). 
40. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1101 n.3. 
41. ld. at 1101. 
42. ld. at 1102. 
43.ld. 
44. ld. at 1103. 
6
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a. Injury to Peace, Happiness and Feelings 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the "appropriation of a celeb-
rity's identity can cause humiliation, embarrassment, and 
mental distress."411 Therefore, damages in addition to compensa-
tion for economic injury are appropriate.46 Mental distress dam-
ages are dependent upon the nature of the infringement and em-
barrassing impact on the singer.47 The court said the damages 
the jury awarded for mental distress were supported by evidence 
showing that Waits found the commercial use of his voice partic-
ularly offensive.48 Waits testified that when he heard the com-
mercial, he was shocked and very angry, and that these feelings 
intensified when friends called and asked him to explain why he 
did the commercia1.49 The commercial humiliated Waits by 
making him appear hypocritical to people who were aware of his 
philosophical opposition to commercialism. CiO 
b. Injury to Goodwill and Future Publicity Value 
The court noted that misappropriation of identity can also 
cause injury to commercial reputation. The jury found that the 
SalsaRio Doritos advertisement created a public impression that 
Waits was a hypocrite because his opposition to commercialism 
was such a fundamental part of the character, personality and 
image that he cultivated. Also, Waits' expert witness testified 
that because of this commercial, it was likely that Waits would 
command a lower fee if he chose to make endorsements in the 
future. CiI 
4. Punitive Damage Award 
The jury awarded $2 million in punitive damages for voice 
misappropriation, $1.5 million from Tracy-Locke and $500,000 
45. Id. at 1103 (quoting Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 
821, 824 n.11 (9th Cir. 1974». 





51. Id. at 1104. 
7
Judy: Torts
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
346 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:339 
from Frito-Lay.1I2 In general, punitive damages are available in 
cases where a defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or 
malice. liS 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the punitive damages award, 
pointing out that the decision in Midler provided notice to the 
defendants that a professional singer has a right to control the 
commercial use of a distinctive voice. The court noted that the 
jury was presented with evidence showing that Frito-Lay and 
Tracy-Locke knew that Waits was opposed to commercial en-
dorsements. The defendants' legal counsel also alerted them 
that potential liability could result from using such a close imi-
tation of Waits' voice in their commercial. Tracy-:Locke was suf-
ficiently aware of Midler to caution Frito-Lay about possible lia-
bility for misappropriation and offered to indemnify Frito-Lay. 
Despite this, the defendants chose to air the Carter version of 
the radio commercial.!!' 
The jury concluded that there was clear and convincing evi-
dence that the defendants acted with malice. The defendants 
took a calculated risk, consciously disregarding the effect of their 
actions on Waits' rights. III! 
B. LANHAM ACT CLAIM 
The purpose of the Lanham Act is to prevent unfair compe-
tition, including false representations concerning association, en-
dorsement, or false representation concerning the qualities of 
goods or services. lie Section 43(a) of the Act prohibits the use of 
false designations of origin, false descriptions, and false repre-
sentations in the advertising and sale of goods and services.1I7 
Waits contended that by using the parody of his song and imi-
tating his voice, the defendants misrepresented his association 
52. [d. 
53. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1992). The 
court noted that malice is defined in the California Civil Code as a "willful and conscious 
disregard of the rights" of others. 
54. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104-05. 
55. Id. at 1105-06. 
56. [d. at 1108. 
57. Id. at 1106 (citing Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981»; see also 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). 
8
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with them and his endorsement of SalsaRio Doritos.1I8 
The jury found in Waits' favor and awarded him $100,000 in 
damages, plus attorneys' fees as provided in section 35 of the 
Lanham Act.1I9 The defendants appealed, contending that Waits 
lacked standing to sue under the Lanham Act, that his claim for 
false endorsement failed on its merits, that the damage award 
was duplicative, and that attorneys' fees were improper.6o 
1. False Endorsement 
Claims for false endorsement include claims by celebrities 
for the unauthorized imitation of their distinctive attributes.61 
False endorsement based on unauthorized use of a celebrity's 
identity is a form of false association that is likely to deceive 
consumers.82 1988 amendments to s~ction 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act clarify the legislative intent in banning the use of any sym-
bol or device likely to deceive consumers as to the association, 
sponsorship, or approval of goods or services by another per-
son.6S "Symbol or device" is interpreted to include distinctive 
sounds and physical appearance.64 
2. Standing 
The defendants challenged Waits' standing to sue under the 
Lanham Act because he was not in direct competition with 
them.611 The Ninth Circuit noted that this argument, if followed, 
would preclude claims by most endorsers who are commercially 
damaged by a false endorsement, contrary to the intended pro-
tections of the Lanham Act.66 The court said the "dispositive 
question" in determining standing is whether the plaintiff "has a 
reasonable interest to be protected against false advertis-
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ing."S7The court recognized that like a trademark holder, an en-
tertainer has a reasonable interest in protecting his work prod-
uct.ss Standing is not limited to actual competition, but extends 
to a purported endorser who has an economic interest akin to a 
trademark in controlling the commercial exploitation of his or 
her identity.ss The advertiser and endorser are both utilizing or 
marketing that personal property, and it is likely that the 
wrongful use of a professional singer's unique voice would injure 
him commercially.70 
3. Merits 
Although the Doritos commercial did not say explicitly that 
Waits endorsed the product, ordinary consumers could be con-
fused. The jury listened to tapes of Waits' voice, tapes of the 
radio commercial, and heard evidence of actual consumer confu-
sion.71 The court pointed out that in addition to the actual con-
fusion, the jury found that the commercial was targeted to an 
audience which overlapped Waits' audience72 (males between 
the ages of 18 to 35 who listened to the radio). Therefore, the 
court upheld the jury's finding of a Lanham Act violation.73 
4. Damages 
The Ninth Circuit Court concluded (and Waits agreed) that 
the $100,000 in damages awarded under the Lanham Act dupli-
cated the award for Waits' voice misappropriation claim repre-
senting the fair market value of his services. For this reason, the 
court allowed Waits to recover this amount in compensatory 
damages only and vacated the award of damages under the Lan-
ham Act.7• 
67. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108 (citing Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 
1981)) (additional citations omitted). 
68. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108. 
69. [d. at 1110. 
70. [d. 
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5. Attorneys' Fees 
Section 35 of the Lanham Act gives trial courts the discre-
tion to award attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs in "excep-
tional cases."711 The court noted that attorney fees were appro-
priate here because there was enough evidence for the jury to 
find that the defendants acted with malice, fraud or 
oppression.76 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit found that Waits' claims for voice misap-
propriation and violations of the Lanham Act were legally suffi-
cient, and held that the trial court did not err in its jury instruc-
tions on the elements of voice misappropriation.77 The Ninth 
Circuit upheld the award of attorneys' fees, but reversed Waits' 
Lanham Act award because it duplicated the voice misappropri-
ation award.78 
In Waits, the Ninth Circuit strengthened the protections 
granted in Midler by holding that a celebrity's distinctive voice 
may not be misappropriated and used for false endorsements. 
The fact that both Frito-Lay and Tracy-Locke were aware of 
Waits' policy against commercial endorsements, the fact that 
they chose a singer who could do a near-perfect imitation of 
Waits' voice, and the fact that they were aware of possible civil 
liability for their actions lead to the conclusion that the defend-
ants took a risk and knowingly impugned Waits' integrity in the 
public eye. 
Cynthia M. Judy* 
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1988). 
76. Waits, 978 F.2d at 111l. 
77. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1112 (9th Cir. 1993). 
78.Id. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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